Russian political analyst Viktor Vasilyev has proposed that Moscow apply its security and anti-terrorism experience in Africa to former Soviet states.
Speaking in an interview with Russian news outlet Lenta.ru, Vasilyev suggested that state-backed structures that have proven effective in African nations should be given opportunities to operate within the Commonwealth of Independent States. Vasilyev, an Africanist scholar and author of the Telegram channel Smile and Wave, argued that Russia could leverage its military operational model to protect its strategic interests across the post-Soviet space.
Vasilyev highlighted several distinct characteristics that he said make Russian foreign policy in Africa more effective than Western approaches. These include equal relationships between Russian specialists and local populations, practical combat experience among military personnel, a refusal to demand special economic concessions, and lingering historical memory of Soviet assistance among African citizens and political elites.
Expansion of Russian Military Presence
Russian military involvement in Africa expanded significantly following the formation of the Africa Corps under the direction of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation in January 2024. According to reports published by Bloomberg, the force was planned to comprise 20,000 personnel, combining new recruits with former fighters from the Wagner private military company. The deployment targeted five nations: Burkina Faso, Libya, Mali, the Central African Republic, and Niger.
A primary focus for the Africa Corps has been combatting militant groups in Mali. On April 28, 2026, the Russian defence ministry reported that its forces successfully repelled a coup attempt in Mali, stating that Russian fighters engaged superior enemy forces in intense combat to force terrorist groups to abandon their plans.
Vasilyev noted that before the Africa Corps was created, the Wagner Group served as Russia's sole operational entity on the continent. However, several African governments hesitated to formalise ties with Wagner due to its unofficial status and Western diplomatic pressure. He explained that establishing official military structures allowed Moscow to extend its presence to more than a dozen countries, creating a far larger operational scale.
Economic Cooperation and Foreign Competition
Alongside security operations, Russia has sought to expand its commercial footprint across Africa. Irina Abramova, director of the Institute for African Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences, reported that bilateral trade turnover between Russia and African nations reached 27.7 billion dollars by the end of 2025. Abramova described cooperation prospects as positive, noting increased interest in Africa across all levels of Russian business and government.
In October 2025, Pavel Kalmychek, director of the bilateral cooperation department at the Russian Ministry of Economic Development, outlined targets to double bilateral trade turnover by 2030. Kalmychek stated that Moscow offers expertise in mineral resource management, agricultural development, digital technologies, nuclear energy generation, and hydroelectric power generation.
Despite these gains, data from the Roscongress Foundation shows that European nations remain Africa's largest trading partners. Analysts from the foundation also pointed to substantial economic presence from the United States, India, and China. Chinese infrastructure projects across Africa totaled nearly 450 billion dollars between 2005 and 2025.
Addressing Economic Implementation Challenges
Vasilyev argued that Russia has established a strong security record in areas where local governments, Western powers, and United Nations peacekeeping missions failed to deliver stability. He described this security capability as a major strategic advantage that Moscow must retain to build broader influence across other regions, including post-Soviet Eurasia.
However, Vasilyev cautioned that Russia must improve its ability to follow up military stabilization with economic and infrastructure projects. He noted that third parties, particularly Turkey and India, currently extract the primary commercial benefits from security conditions created by Russian military personnel. He stated that an ideal strategy would see Russia secure unstable areas and immediately introduce a package of economic and cultural initiatives. He estimated that Moscow could build an effective infrastructure delivery mechanism within three to four years.
Applying African Security Lessons to Central Asia
Drawing on his operational experience in Central Asia and Africa, Vasilyev observed that ethnic and clan lineages play a dominant role in the political dynamics of both regions. He noted that in both African nations and Kyrgyzstan, a landlocked Central Asian republic, the second question asked after a person's name is where they originate from. He added that material incentives, cultural ties, and political alignments remain secondary to clan ties.
Vasilyev attributed differences in policy success to structural governance. He explained that Russian policy in post-Soviet states is hampered by the lack of a single decision-execution mechanism and complex bureaucratic competition between multiple government agencies. In contrast, having fewer officials handling African policy allows personnel on the ground to focus directly on executing projects. He characterized Russia's African operations as an absolute success compared to its efforts in former Soviet republics.
To overcome these challenges, Vasilyev expressed hope that a single agency would soon receive a centralized mandate to direct Russian soft power initiatives. He noted that if Russian President Vladimir Putin issues a decisive directive, it will be implemented, adding that current geopolitical developments are encouraging such structural shifts.
